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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE STOCKHOLDER – BONDHOLDER 
CONFLICT IN CORPORATE SPIN-OFFS 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
  We analyze the effect of daily stock and bond abnormal returns around spin-off 
announcements. Over a three-day event window, we find statistically significant 
abnormal returns of 3.07% for stocks and 0.11% for straight bonds. Both stock and 
bond abnormal returns are higher for firms with lower interest and dividend payouts. 
Stock abnormal returns are also higher for firms with higher pre-spin-off leverage. 
Overall, we find that the firm value increase compensates for the wealth transfer 
effect and that bondholders’ wealth is not reduced as a result of spin-off. 
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Over the past 20 years, many diversified firms have gone back to basics by 
refocusing on their core businesses. An important reason is that extensive research, 
starting with Berger and Ofek (1995), shows that diversified firms' equity trades at a 
discount compared to that of single-business firms. A common way for a firm to 
refocus on its core business lines is to spin off its non-core divisions. In this paper, 
our objective is to study the consequences of the spin-off announcements for both 
stock- and bondholders.  
The decision to spin off a subsidiary is usually associated with a restructuring 
of the parent firm and improvement of the overall operations of both the parent and 
the subsidiary. The stock market generally receives announcements of a spin-off 
decision positively. Previous studies from all over the world uniformly document 
economically and statistically significant positive abnormal returns of up to 5.56% 
during the spin-off announcement window.1 These findings are in line with the 
diversification discount literature. Among the factors that play a role in the value 
creation that results from a spin-off are focus increase, reduction of information 
asymmetry, and improved operational performance.2 
                                                          
1 See for example, Copeland, Lemgruber, and Mayers (1987), Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1993), Daley, Mehrotra, 
and Sivakumar (1997), Hite and Owers (1983), Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), Miles and Rosenfeld (1983), 
Mulherin and Boone (2000), Schipper and Smith (1983), and Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro (1995) for the United States, 
Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) for European countries, and Koh, Koh, and Koh (2005) for Singapore. 
2 The expected improvement in the operational performance of the reorganized firms is not clearly confirmed. For 
example, Boone, Haushalter, and Mikkelson (2003) study a sample of carve-outs. They find that performance did not 
improve beyond the first post-carve-out year. 
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Although it is clear from other studies that spin-offs benefit stockholders, the 
position of bondholders is less evident. One point of view is that bondholders benefit 
from the value increase of the firm. An alternative point of view is that bondholders 
suffer from a spin-off since the risk of an undiversified firm is higher. Mansi and 
Reeb (2002) show that the risk reduction, which is due to diversification, is one of the 
sources of the diversification discount. This risk reduction is caused by the 
coinsurance that arises when the cash flows from the different divisions are not 
perfectly correlated. Lower asset risk results in a higher value of the corporate debt 
securities. This coinsurance disappears with a spin-off, so the loss of diversification 
may lead to a value transfer from bondholders to stockholders. 
Hite and Owers (1983) and Dittmar (2004) propose that spin-offs are 
detrimental to the value of corporate debt. Neither study confirms this wealth transfer 
hypothesis, since Hite and Owers find nonsignificant abnormal bond returns around 
the date of the spin-off announcement and Dittmar finds the same during the 
announcement month. However, in a case study of the Marriott Corporation, Parrino 
(1997) documents a wealth transfer from the bondholders to the stockholders of 
Marriott. The spin-off announcement, made in October 1992, was associated with a 
large increase in the stock price. However, directly after the issue, Moody’s lowered 
its rating of Marriott’s senior debt, leading to a decline in the prices of some of 
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Marriott’s debt by as much as 30%.  Using monthly data, Maxwell and Rao (2003) 
also find a wealth transfer from the bondholders to the stockholders.  
We use daily stock and bond data and analyze the factors that drive abnormal 
returns over a short event window. We also analyze the returns that accrue to the 
stock- and bondholders. We find an abnormal return for stockholders of 2.02% on the 
announcement date. The three-day event window even shows an abnormal return of 
3.07%. Both results are significant on the 1% level. More surprising is the positive 
abnormal return of 0.14% for the holders of straight bonds on the announcement date. 
The return during the three-day event-window is 0.11%. Both results are also 
significant on the 1% level. Our results contradict the results of Maxwell and Rao 
(2003). To investigate the difference in results between our study and the Maxwell 
and Rao paper, we split up our sample in two subsamples. The first subsample covers 
the period 1995-1997. This period overlaps with the last years of the sample period of 
Maxwell and Rao. The second subsample covers 1998-2002.  For the first subsample 
we find negative but not significant bond returns (-0.14%) and for the second 
subsample we find significantly positive bond returns (0.14%). This result suggests 
that the difference between the two studies is mostly driven by different sample 
periods. A related explanation may be that the results of Maxwell and Rao seem to be 
partly driven by some extreme cases where bondholders suffered large wealth losses. 
For example, in the Marriott case bondholders lost 16.51% of their wealth (Parrino, 
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1997). It is possible that after the occurrence of this case, bondholders learned how to 
better protect themselves against this type of expropriation.  
We use three-stage least squares regression to explain stock and bond 
abnormal returns. We hypothesize that a number of variables affect stock and bond 
abnormal returns in the same way. We find that the pre-spin-off leverage affects 
stock returns positively. We use the Leland and Toft (1996) model, which predicts 
that although debt and equity values are inversely related to asset volatility in most 
cases, this relation reverses for high levels of debt. Therefore, a high pre-spin-off 
level of leverage is associated with positive abnormal stock returns.  
The Leland and Toft (1996) model also predicts that abnormal returns for both 
stocks and bonds are negatively affected if the payout in the form of interest and 
dividend is high before the spin-off. The stock and bond abnormal returns in our 
study confirm this prediction.  
Several previous studies find that an increase in industrial focus has a positive 
effect on the abnormal stock returns that are associated with spin-offs.3 Our study 
does not confirm this finding. The hypothesized relation between industrial focus and 
bond returns is less obvious. We find no significant relation between industrial focus 
and abnormal bond returns. This finding probably means that the effects of increase 
in firm value and in asset volatility cancel each other out. Finally, we find that other 
                                                          
3 See for example Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar (1997), Desai and Jain (1999), and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 
(1999).  
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factors, such as information asymmetry, are either not significant, or do not have the 
hypothesized relation to abnormal stock and bond returns.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the factors used to 
explain abnormal returns. Sections 3 describe the data and the methodology, Section 
4 presents the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.  
 
I. Factors that affect change in firm value 
 
We investigate several factors that play a role in the stock and bond market 
reactions to spin-off announcements. We hypothesize that all these factors contribute 
to the total value created by the spin-offs.  
 
A. Change in degree of the firm’s diversification  
 
The value of the corporate securities can undergo a twofold effect when there 
is a change in the degree of a firm’s diversification. Extensive research on the 
diversification discount suggests that the market value of more-diversified companies 
is lower than is the value of single-segment firms (see, e.g., studies by Berger and 
Ofek, 1995, or Servaes, 1996). Reasons for this include inefficient internal capital 
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markets, agency problems, and poor previous merger decisions.4 These factors 
underlie our hypothesis that a decrease in the level of firm’s diversification could 
result in the overall increase in firm’s value, and consequently, that the spin-off 
announcement returns would be positively related to the increase in firm’s industrial 
focus.  
However, changes in the firm’s diversification may also lead to a redistribution 
of wealth between different classes of securities. Two major reasons for that are 
higher asset risk and possible reduction in the debt collateral. Galai and Masulis 
(1976) argue that bondholders, after a spin-off, may find that their position is 
deteriorated because fewer assets now serve as collateral for the debt. Furthermore, 
when the cash flows from different divisions are not perfectly correlated, spinning off 
part of a company leads to a higher volatility of the firm’s assets. This increases the 
value of the common stock at the expense of the bondholders. Mansi and Reeb 
(2002) show that most of the diversification discount found in previous studies can in 
fact be explained by this wealth redistribution that results in a higher debt market 
value for diversified companies.5  
                                                          
4 For example, Doukas and Kan (2004) find that the diversification discount is positively related to the post-acquisition 
reductions in excess cash flows. 
5 This point of view is consistent with the study by Villalonga (2004) who after controlling for a wide range of firm 
characteristics finds that diversification by itself does not destroy value. 
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Both the firm value increase and the wealth transfer theories suggest that the 
stockholders’ wealth should increase as a result of a decrease in the firm’s 
diversification. These theories lead to our first hypothesis: 
H1: An increase in industrial focus affects abnormal returns positively for 
stockholders.  
The effect of the focus-increasing spin-offs on the value of debt is not obvious. 
The outcome will depend on the question which of the two opposite effects will 
dominate. The first effect, the expected firm value increase due to the elimination of 
inefficiencies, should be beneficial to bondholders. The second effect, the increase in 
risk and reduction in collateral, should decrease the wealth of bondholders. 
Therefore, we formulate the competing hypotheses 2a and 2b. Hypothesis 2a will 
hold for bondholders if the expected value increase due to the elimination of 
inefficiencies is larger than is the value decrease due to the increase in risk and the 
reduction in the asset base: 
H2a: An increase in industrial focus affects abnormal returns positively for 
bondholders. 
Hypothesis 2b will hold if the negative effects for the bondholders dominate 
the positive effects: 
H2b: An increase in industrial focus affects abnormal returns negatively for 
bondholders. 
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B. Leverage and degree of financial distress  
 
Reducing assets and cash flows by divesting a unit can increase bankruptcy 
risk and adversely affect the value of the debt. Lower bankruptcy risk for large 
diversified firms may explain the higher debt valuation found for such firms by 
Mansi and Reeb (2002). On the other hand, the Leland and Toft (1996) model 
predicts that although debt and equity values are inversely related to the asset 
volatility in most cases, this relation  reverses for very high levels of leverage (“junk 
bonds”). The reason is that the higher risk may increase the probability that 
bankruptcy is avoided. Therefore, both the equity and debt of financially troubled 
companies can benefit from the risk increase following a spin-off. Our firm-value-
increase hypothesis suggests that both stock- and bondholders benefit more from a 
spin-off if the leverage prior to the spin-off is higher: 
H3: A higher pre-spin-off leverage affects abnormal returns positively for 
stockholders. 
H4: A higher pre-spin-off leverage affects abnormal returns positively for 
bondholders. 
 
C. Information asymmetry 
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 One of the most frequent motivations for the spin-offs cited by the 
management of the involved companies is the need to reduce information asymmetry 
between company insiders and the market. The argument here is that the investment 
analysts cannot correctly value firms that operate in different industrial sectors, so the 
market undervalues such companies. If this is the case, then a spin-off might result in 
lower information asymmetry and higher valuation of a firm. Such an increase in 
valuation does not cause a wealth transfer between bond- and stockholders, and 
should benefit both groups. We hypothesize that both bond- and stockholders profit 
from a spin-off by a firm that has a higher level of pre-spin-off information 
asymmetry: 
H5: A higher pre-spin-off level of information asymmetry affects abnormal 
returns positively for stockholders. 
H6: A higher pre-spin-off level of information asymmetry affects abnormal 
returns positively for bondholders. 
  
D. Firm liquidity  
 
The total cash payouts (i.e., interest and dividend payments) made by a 
company to its bond- and stockholders affect both the firm's value and its ability to 
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efficiently restructure. Excessive payouts relative to the operating cash flow decrease 
the total value of the company assets and increase bankruptcy risk. Leland and Toft’s 
(1996) model suggests that the bondholders suffer substantial wealth losses due to the 
increase in payout level. In addition, the debt of companies with higher payout ratios 
starts to suffer from the risk increase at lower volatility levels. Therefore, we expect 
that if the pre-spin-off payout in the form of dividends and interest payments relative 
to the cash flow is high, then it will negatively affect abnormal returns. This factor 
affects the value of the whole company and it will go in the same direction for both 
bondholders and stockholders: 
H7: A higher level of pre-spin-off payout affects abnormal returns negatively 
for stockholders. 
H8: A higher level of pre-spin-off payout affects abnormal returns negatively 
for bondholders. 
 
E. Efficiency  
 
An improvement in efficiency is likely to increase, at least to some extent, the 
value of both firm debt and equity. Furthermore, the companies with less efficient 
pre-spin-off operations are likely to benefit most from this reorganization: 
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H9: More efficient pre-spin-off operations affect abnormal returns negatively 
for stockholders. 
H10: More efficient pre-spin-off operations affect abnormal returns negatively 
for bondholders.  
 
F. Investment expenditures 
  
Although it provides a tax shield, the presence of outstanding risky debt can 
also lead to an underinvestment problem. John's (1993) model predicts that due to the 
possibility of optimally reallocating company debt between the parent and subsidiary, 
spin-offs might result in improved investment policy and result in higher firm value 
without losing the tax advantages of corporate debt. Johnson, Klein, and Thibodeaux 
(1996) also find that after a spin-off, the real growth of the total assets of both the 
spin-off parent and the spun-off subsidiary significantly increase from below the 
industry median to a level close to the industry median.  
Our hypothesis, which is based on John’s (1993) model, is that firms with low 
pre-spin-off investment expenditures suffer the most from the underinvestment 
problem and benefit more from spin-offs than do the companies with higher 
investment outflows. Therefore, we expect the investment expenditure variable to 
have a negative coefficient for the abnormal stock returns, because firms with higher 
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pre-spin-off investment expenditures experience a lower value increase due to the 
spin-off announcement:  
H11: Higher pre-spin-off investment expenditures affect abnormal returns 
negatively for both stockholders and bondholders. 
 Since the effect is on the firm value, bondholders may also profit from the 
lower probability of underinvestment for firms that have low pre-spin-off investment 
expenditures. For this reason, we also expect a negative coefficient for bondholders: 
 H12: Higher pre-spin-off investment expenditures affect abnormal returns 
negatively for bondholders. 
 
II. Method and data description 
 
This section discusses the sample selection, the method, and the data that we use. 
 
A. Sample selection 
 
We use a sample of spin-offs by US firms to test our hypotheses. We obtain the 
spin-off announcements, which cover the period from January 1995 to January 2002, 
from the SDC and Lexis-Nexis databases. The total number of announcements is 612.  
When we exclude double announcements made by the same parent company 
on the same day, this number reduces to 571. A necessary requirement for these firms 
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is that both stock and bond prices must be available from either Datastream or 
Bloomberg database. Of these 571 observations, no bond data are available in either 
Datastream or Bloomberg database for 396 cases. To eliminate announcements that 
either involve contaminating information or are incorrectly classified as spin-offs, we 
also check the remaining 175 announcements in Bloomberg. Doing so eliminates 84 
observations, leaving a sample of 91 spin-offs. Table I presents the excluded 
observations by the reason for elimination.  
[Please place Table I here] 
The price data are available in either Datastream or Bloomberg for 363 straight 
bonds and 27 convertible bonds issued by 78 different companies (11 companies 
announced more than one spin-off). Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) find that the 
available information is very quickly incorporated in the prices of the exchange-
traded bonds, generally within one day. Therefore, we consider these prices a good 
source for the study of market reaction to spin-off announcements.  
 
B. Abnormal stock returns 
 
To measure stock market reaction to spin-off announcements we use an event 
study method adapted from Mikkelson and Partch (1986).  We define the 
announcement period as the period from day –1 to day +1, where day 0 denotes the 
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announcement day as reported by SDC or the first day the announcement appears in a 
press release. We estimate the market model for each security using a period of 200 
trading days, from day –220 to day –21 before the announcement date. The S&P 500 
index returns are our proxy for the stock market returns. 
 
C. Abnormal bond returns 
 
We use the Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) method, which adjusts for 
infrequent trading, to measure the abnormal bond returns over the event period. The 
returns on rating- and maturity-matched corporate bond indexes of Merrill Lynch are 
our proxy for a bond market index return. The estimation window for the abnormal 
bond return calculations is the period from day -65 to day -21. We choose this 45 
trading day period in order to minimize the potential impact of credit-spread changes.  
Following the Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) method, we define the 
premium bond return between two bond trades as the difference between the return 
on the bond and the corresponding index return over the same time period: 
PRi,n(i,k) = Ri,n(i,k) – IRi,n(i,k),     (1) 
where Ri,n(i,k) stands for the corporate bond i return from trading date n(i,k-1) to 
trading date n(i,k), and IRi,n(i,k) is the matching index return over the same time period.  
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We estimate the mean mi and standard deviation si of the bond premium returns 
as 
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where K is the number of days bond i was traded in the estimation period. 
We calculate the abnormal bond return by using the estimated mean premium 
return: 
ARi,n(i,k) = PRi,n(i,k) – mi[n(i,k) – n(i,k-1)]    (4) 
The standardized abnormal return is equal to  
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For every event window, the standardized and average abnormal portfolio 
returns include only those bonds that are traded on the last day and on the day 
directly preceding the event period. (E.g., for the event period from day –1 to day +1 
we include only the bonds traded on days –2 and +1 in the sample.)  We define the 
test statistics for these observations as  
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where t is event window, nt is the number of observations included for a given event 
window, and N is the number of days in the event window. This statistic has a unit-
normal distribution under the assumption of cross-sectional bond return 
independence.  
In several cases, data for more than one bond are available for a sample 
company. We treat these cases in two different ways. First, we compile a complete 
sample of all the available bonds (from now on called the "All-Bond Sample"). As 
Maxwell and Stephens (2003) note, this approach overestimates t-statistics by 
treating highly correlated bonds of the same firms as independent observations. 
Therefore, our second sample includes only the median bond return for each firm that 
serves as a proxy for the return to the firm bondholders (the "Firm Sample"). 
 
D. Proxies 
 
The variables in our analysis are related to our hypotheses. Unless otherwise stated, 
we base all variables on the companies’ annual accounting data reported for the year 
directly preceding the spin-off announcements. The source for these data is 
Datastream and annual reports. 
1. Change in the degree of the firm’s diversification 
 18
As in previous studies, we use an industrial focus variable as our proxy for the 
decrease in the diversification level. We measure this variable as a dummy equal to 
one if the parent and subsidiary are in different industries (measured by the two-digit 
SIC code), and as zero if the parent and subsidiary to be spun off are in the same 
industry. 
2. Leverage and degree of financial distress 
We use the debt ratio, measured as the ratio of total debt to invested capital, as our 
proxy for leverage. Both total debt and invested capital are based on book values at 
the end of the year preceding the spin-off announcement. 
3. Information asymmetry 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) find that stock return volatility is highly 
correlated with other measures of information asymmetry that are based on the 
accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. Therefore, we use the residual volatility of asset 
returns prior to the spin-off announcement as our proxy for the information 
asymmetry between managers and outsiders. We measure the asset volatility as the 
weighted average of the annualized residual stock and bond volatility. The weights 
are based on the leverage at the end of the year preceding the spin-off. 
4. Firm liquidity 
Interest and dividend payout is our proxy for this variable. We measure these payouts 
as the sum of total interest and dividend payments to operating cash flow. 
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5. Efficiency  
We measure the efficiency of the firm’s operations as the sales to assets ratio, also 
known as the assets turnover ratio, at the end of the year preceding the spin-off 
announcement.  
6. Investment expenditures 
We measure the investment expenditures by the ratio of cash flows for investment 
activities to earnings before interest and taxes. We also measure this ratio at the end 
of the year preceding the spin-off announcement.  
7. Control variables 
Many studies find that the wealth effects are larger when the portion of assets that is 
divested is larger. Therefore, we control for the relative size of a spin-off by using 
two variables for spin-off size. The first variable is the pre-spin-off ratio of subsidiary 
assets to the total assets of the parent company (from now on to be referred to as 
“relative size”). The second variable is the relative size multiplied by a dummy 
variable that equals one when the abnormal return is negative and zero when it is 
positive. The combination of these two variables captures the relation between the 
relative size and the absolute magnitude of the abnormal returns. 
 
E. Sample description 
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Table II presents firm size, leverage, and profitability statistics for the 
companies in our sample.  
[Please place Table II here] 
There are 91 spin-off announcements in the sample for which there are straight and/or 
convertible bond data available. The average number of straight bonds per company 
is 3.99. The mean book value of assets is $21.1 billion, the leverage is 46.8%, the 
mean annualized volatility of stock returns is 33.6%, and the mean volatility of 
(straight) bond returns is 5.4%. 
The spin-offs in our sample are relatively large ones. On average, companies 
spin off 21.1% of the book value of their total assets in a transaction. Most of them 
(55%) are spin-offs of divisions that are operating in a different industry from the 
parent.  
 
F. The models of abnormal stock and bond returns 
  
We use the factors described in subsection D to explain the abnormal stock and 
bond returns during the event window. When we run a regression analysis, we must 
take into account that the spin-offs affect the value of debt and equity in two ways: 
first, by changing the value of the entire firm, and second, by redistributing the 
wealth between share- and bondholders. Therefore, we should include the abnormal 
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returns themselves in the model as (endogenous) explanatory variables. We solve this 
problem by estimating a system of two simultaneous equations for the stock and bond 
abnormal returns. We estimate the system by using three-stage least squares. This 
method takes into account heteroskedasticity and correlation in the errors across the 
equations, and allows for the correlation of the explanatory variables with the error 
terms.  
We have also estimated an OLS regression for the returns on the entire firm. In 
this regression, we calculate the firms' returns as a weighted average of the stock and 
bond returns, using the pre-spin-off values of equity and debt to assets as weights. 
This regression estimates how the total value effect of spin-offs is explained by the 
separate factors. 
 
III. Empirical results 
We start this section by discussing the results for the abnormal returns, followed by a 
discussion of the results from the regression analysis. 
 
A. Abnormal returns 
 
Table III presents the announcement-period abnormal returns for the stock- and 
the bondholders.  
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[Please place Table III here] 
In Table III, Panel A presents the returns for the stockholders. The mean abnormal 
return on the announcement date is a positive and highly significant 2.02%. On the 
announcement date, more than 71% of the sample companies’ abnormal returns are 
positive. The total three-day abnormal returns are even higher (3.07%). These results 
are similar to those found in previous studies on announcement effects associated 
with corporate spin-offs.  
We note that we checked the abnormal returns for the period of 20 to two days 
before the spin-off announcement. These returns are not significant. This finding 
makes it unlikely that there was any information leakage in the period preceding the 
announcement.   
The results for the straight and convertible bonds are presented in Panels B and 
C of Table III. Panel B shows mean and median abnormal returns for the whole bond 
sample. The straight bonds subsample shows a positive abnormal return of 0.14%. 
This abnormal return is significant at the 1% level. The abnormal return for the three-
day event window is 0.11%. This return is also significant at the 1% level. The 
positive one- and three-day abnormal returns suggest that wealth transfers from 
bondholders to stockholders are either nonexistent or so small that they are 
outweighed by the benefits. As above, we calculated the abnormal returns for the 
period of 20 to two days preceding the announcement date. Again, these returns are 
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not significant, making it unlikely that there was any information leakage in this 
period. 
The convertible bonds subsample does not show significant abnormal returns 
on either the announcement date or in the three-day announcement period.  
Since the observations in Panel B of Table III are from all the available bonds, 
some of the announcements are represented by two or more bonds. A possible high 
correlation between different bonds of the same company violates the independence 
assumption underlying the statistical tests of significance. Consequently the test 
statistics could be overstated. To avoid this problem, in Panel C of Table III we 
present the results for the “firm sample.” In this sample, one observation is the return 
on firm’s total debt rather than on individual bonds. We approximate these returns by 
using the median abnormal returns on all available bonds for a given company (or the 
actual bond returns for firms with data on only one available traded bond). The 
results in Panel C confirm the all-bond sample results presented in Panel B, but are 
less significant due to the smaller number of observations. On the announcement 
date, the abnormal return is 0.06% for straight bonds, significant at the 1% level, and 
–0.7% for convertible bonds, significant at the 10% level. Thus, the immediate bond 
market reaction to spin-off announcements is positive for straight bonds. There is no 
evidence that the market expects a wealth transfer to take place as a result of a spin-
off.  
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A possible explanation for the positive abnormal returns to the bondholders is 
that the market sees spin-off announcements as a signal that either the total firm value 
is going to increase as a result of spin-off, or that the total firm value is higher than 
previously estimated by the market. The latter factor is also frequently cited as one of 
the reasons for the positive stock price reaction.  
An alternative explanation comes from Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft 
(1996). A spin-off is a corporate transaction that divides one company into separate 
divisions. Unless the cash flows from these divisions are perfectly correlated, such a 
transaction is bound to increase the firm’s volatility. Although higher volatility is a 
negative factor for investment-grade bonds, it may be beneficial for the low-grade 
bonds of companies that are close to bankruptcy: in this case, the debt of highly 
leveraged firms should display higher abnormal returns at the spin-off 
announcements than would investment-grade debt.  
Panel D of Table III presents evidence of the total value created by spin-off 
announcements, and the relation between abnormal stock and bond returns. The bond 
returns in this table are the returns of both straight and convertible bonds. We 
calculate the abnormal returns on the total parent firm that we show in this panel as 
an average of the stock and bond abnormal returns, weighted by the values of the 
equity- and debt-to-assets ratios at the end of the fiscal year preceding the spin-off 
announcement. This panel shows that corporate spin-offs result in an increase in total 
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firm value of 2.25% over the three-day event window, and that more than 70% of the 
companies experience this increase. This evidence is consistent with theoretical 
explanations based on a decrease of agency costs of internal capital markets, lower 
information asymmetry, an increase in operational efficiency, and a reduction in 
underinvestment.  
The last column of Panel D shows the relation between abnormal changes in 
the values of debt and equity for the two different event windows. This column 
shows that on the announcement day these changes are uncorrelated, and that over 
the three-day event window they are correlated negatively, which could indicate a 
possible wealth transfer between the bond- and stockholders.  The fact that the one-
day event window results are qualitatively different from the three-day event window 
results suggests that the bond prices react to the announcement information with at 
least a one-day delay. For this reason, the focus in the remainder of the paper is on 
the three-day abnormal returns. 
 
B. Comparison with previous studies 
 
Our result that bondholders do not suffer from a spin-off announcement 
supports the findings of previous studies by Hite and Owers (1983), Schipper and 
Smith (1983), and Dittmar (2004). Schipper and Smith (1983) and Dittmar (2004) 
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find that only a small number of companies decline in bond ratings after the spin-off. 
Schipper and Smith find that such a decline took place in two out of 18 cases. 
Dittmar finds a decline in three out of 61 cases. However, she also finds an 
improvement in eight out of the 61 cases that she analyzes. Schipper and Smith 
(1983) look at price changes for 26 bonds around 13 spin-off announcements. They 
find 13 price increases, 11 price decreases and two cases of no price change.  
Hite and Owers (1983), Dittmar (2004), and Maxwell and Rao (2003) study 
bondholder wealth effects. Hite and Owers (1983) find on average a nonsignificant 
positive wealth effect for 15 bonds during the event period of day (-1, 0). Dittmar 
studies monthly announcement effects for bondholders. On average she finds 
nonsignificantly negative announcement results.  
Maxwell and Rao (2003) find a significantly negative abnormal return of -
0.88% for bondholders. This result contradicts our earlier reported results. However, 
a direct comparison between our previously reported results and those of Maxwell 
and Rao (2003) is difficult for two reasons: first, because they report abnormal 
returns for the announcement month, but we report abnormal returns for the three-day 
announcement period; and second, because their results cover the period from 1976 
to 1997, but our results are for the period from 1995 to 2002. To make our results 
comparable to theirs, we calculate abnormal returns for the announcement month. We 
also divide our sample in two different subperiods. Table IV includes these results. 
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To further facilitate the comparison we also present the event-study results of Hite 
and Owers (1983), Dittmar (2004), and Maxwell and Rao (2003). 
[Please place Table IV here] 
In Panel A of Table IV we present event study results for the three-day event window 
(day -1 to day 1), which we base on Panels A and C of Table III. To compare our 
results to those of Maxwell and Rao (2003), we also present results for the two-day 
event window (day 0 to day 1). Our stock returns are similar between the various 
event windows (3.07% for the three-day window and 2.44% for the two-day 
window). Our bond returns are not significantly positive for both the two-day and 
three-day windows.  
To compare our bond returns to those of Maxwell and Rao (2003), we use their 
method to calculate monthly returns. From Panel A we conclude that these monthly 
bond returns do not substantially differ from our daily returns. The mean bond return 
is a significantly positive 0.18%. However, this significance is driven by only one 
outlier. Excluding this outlier would make the monthly bond return a nonsignificant 
0.17%. The median bond return is 0.02%, which is not significantly different from 
zero. Based on these results, we believe that the difference in results between our 
study and the Maxwell and Rao (2003) paper is not based on the use of daily versus 
monthly returns.  
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In Panel B we study whether the difference between our results and those of 
Maxwell and Rao (2003) may be driven by the different choice of sample periods, so 
we split our sample period in two parts: the first part (1995-1997) overlaps with the 
last part of Maxwell and Rao’s (2003) sample period; the second part (1998-2002) 
does not overlap with their study. We find that the abnormal stock returns are slightly 
higher in the first years of our sample (3.63% versus 2.57%). However, the difference 
between the returns in both samples is not significant.  
A more interesting result is the difference in bond returns. For the first part of 
our sample we find a non-significant negative bond return of -0.14% and for the 
second part we find a significant positive abnormal bond return (0.14%). The 
difference between two subsamples is 0.27%. This difference is significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level. Even though the sign for the first part of our 
sample is the same as that for Maxwell and Rao (2003), we note that on average they 
find a larger negative return than we do (-0.88%). We believe that this difference may 
at least partly be driven by some large negative outliers. For example, in the 
introduction we mentioned the Marriott spin-off, described in Parrino (1997). This 
spin-off took place in 1993, and was announced in 1992, a year that is included in the 
sample of Maxwell and Rao (2003) sample, but not in ours. The bondholder wealth 
loss in this case was 16.51% during the three days following the spin-off 
announcement. This outlier is likely to have a significant impact on the average bond 
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returns. This case, and possibly others, may also explain the large difference between 
Maxwell and Rao’s mean abnormal bond returns and their median abnormal bond 
returns (-0.27%).  
It should be noticed that for the remainder our results are similar to those of 
Maxwell and Rao (2003). For example, in Panel D of Table III, we find a negative 
correlation between abnormal changes in the values of debt and equity during the 
three-day event window. Maxwell and Rao present a similar result in their regression 
analysis in Table VI, where they find a negative relationship between the abnormal 
change in the market value of debt and the abnormal change in the market value of 
equity. 
 
C. Factors that explain abnormal stock returns  
 
The regressions for stock and bond three-day abnormal returns are jointly 
estimated by the three-stage least squares method, which efficiently uses all 
information available in the data. We add the abnormal stock return to the bond 
return regression to capture wealth transfer effects not explained by the other factors. 
We also add dummies for subordinated bonds and for senior bonds.  
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Table V presents the results for the three-stage least squares regression. The t-
statistics appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. We also present the 
hypotheses. 
[Please place Table V here] 
When we include six explanatory and two control variables, the explanatory 
power of the stock regression, measured by the adjusted R squared, is 0.52.  
The dummy for increase in industrial focus is positive, but not statistically 
significant (the t-statistic is 1.375). This result does not confirm our hypothesis that 
an increase in industrial focus affects abnormal returns positively for stockholders 
(Hypothesis 1). The coefficient for leverage is significant and positive, indicating that 
stockholders of the more leveraged firms benefit more from the spin-offs. This 
finding supports the hypothesis that a higher pre-spin-off leverage affects abnormal 
returns positively (Hypothesis 3).  
The coefficient for pre-spin-off asset volatility is not significant. This 
contradicts the information asymmetry hypothesis (Hypothesis 5). The abnormal 
returns of companies with high pre-spin-off levels of information asymmetry are the 
same as for firms with low information asymmetry.  
Firms that pay higher interest and dividends as a ratio of their operating cash 
flow have lower abnormal stock returns. Firms sometimes mention the possibility for 
independent growth and attracting new capital as a reason to spin off divisions. The 
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negative coefficient for interest and dividend payout ratios in our regression suggests 
that firms with higher payouts cannot fully profit from the growth opportunities 
offered by spin-offs. This negative relation between the payout ratio and the stock 
returns on the spin-off announcement is also consistent with the Leland and Toft 
(1996) model (Hypothesis 7).  
The coefficient for the asset turnover is significantly positive at the 5% level, 
indicating that the stocks of the more efficiently run companies also profit more from 
the restructuring efforts. This contradicts the hypothesis based on Schipper and Smith 
(1983) (Hypothesis 9).6  
We find no relation between company investment expenditures (measured as 
the ratio of cash outflow for investment activities to earnings before interest and 
taxes) and the spin-off abnormal returns. Thus, the underinvestment reduction 
hypothesis based on John (1993) finds no confirmation. (Hypothesis 11).7  
Both coefficients for spin-off size are significant, indicating that relatively 
large spin-offs are associated with higher absolute abnormal returns, either positive or 
negative. 
 
D. Factors that explain abnormal bond returns  
                                                          
6 Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1994) find that several measures of operating performance do improve after a spin-
off. However, they do not relate this improvement to the market reaction to a spin-off announcement. 
7 Although we find no relationship between the abnormal returns and investment levels before a spin-off, Cusatis et al. 
(1994) find that the level of investment activity rises after a spin-off. 
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We start by running a separate regression in which we regress the abnormal 
three-day “firm” bond returns on separate dummies for subordinated bonds and 
senior bonds. This regression gives a significant coefficient for the senior bond 
dummy (significant on the 5% level). The complete regression results (with t-
statistics in brackets) are as follows: intercept: -0.051 (-0.572); dummy for 
subordinated bonds, 0.317 (1.126); dummy for senior bonds, 0.394 (1.939). The 
adjusted R squared is 0.029.  
We hypothesize that the same factors that affect stock returns also affect bond 
returns. In Table V, Column 7 presents the results when we estimate the same model 
as for the common stock returns for the three-day (day –1 to day 1) abnormal bond 
returns.  We see that although some of these factors also play a role for the bond 
market, they explain a much smaller portion of the variance in the abnormal bond 
returns. Compared to the stock return model, where the adjusted R squared is equal to 
0.52, the bond regression explains 30% of the variations in the bond abnormal 
returns.  
Industrial focus is not significant for stocks and it is also not significant in the 
bond regression (Hypotheses 2a and 2b). It means that the effects of an increase in 
firm value and the wealth transfer probably cancel out each other. 
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Leverage has a statistically significant coefficient for stock returns. It is not 
significant in the bond regression. Therefore, the hypothesis derived from the Leland 
and Toft (1996) model, is not confirmed for abnormal bond returns (Hypothesis 4). 
The coefficient for information asymmetry, which was not significant for the 
abnormal stock returns, is also not significant for the abnormal bond returns 
(Hypothesis 6). 
The payout ratio (interest and dividend to operating cash flow) has significant 
coefficients in both the stock and the bond regressions, which means that this 
hypothesis is also confirmed for bond returns (Hypothesis 8). 
Earlier, we noted that efficiency, measured as the asset turnover, has a 
significant, positive coefficient for stock returns. This result is surprising, because we 
hypothesized a negative coefficient. The coefficient is nonsignificant for bond 
returns. Therefore, the hypothesis for bond returns is also not confirmed (Hypothesis 
10).  
The coefficient for investment expenditures is nonsignificant for the bond 
regression. It means that we cannot confirm our hypothesis (Hypothesis 12). 
The coefficients for spin-off size are significant, indicating that relatively large 
spin-offs are associated with higher absolute abnormal bond returns, either positive or 
negative. The coefficient for the abnormal stock returns is significant and negative  in 
the bond regressions, showing that spin-off announcements lead to a transfer of 
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wealth from bondholders to stockholders. This wealth transfer cannot be explained by 
the other factors included in the model. It suggests that individual terms and 
conditions of spin-offs that are not included in the regression model play an 
important role in the wealth transfer process.  
The dummies for subordinated bonds and senior bonds are not significant. The 
lower significance of the dummy for senior bonds (compared to the OLS regression 
of bond returns on bond seniority) is probably caused by the relation of the senior 
bond dummy and other variables. In fact, the p-value for this variable only changes 
from 0.06 to 0.14.     
 
E. Regressions for the total firm returns  
 
Table VI shows the relation between the total value created by spin-offs and 
the underlying factors.  
[Please place Table VI here] 
The negative coefficient for the payout ratio is consistent with the Leland and 
Toft (1996) model. Companies that are able to retain more of their earnings are less 
sensitive to the increase of bankruptcy risk, and they also profit more from the 
growth opportunities offered by spin-offs. 
 35
Neither the pre-spin-off level of investment expenditures nor the level of 
information asymmetry significantly affects the total firm returns. This evidence 
rejects the underinvestment reduction motive offered for spin-offs by John (1993) and 
the information asymmetry motive suggested by Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 
(1999).  
The coefficient for efficiency, which we measure as the asset turnover, is 
significant and positive. This result indicates that companies with a high pre-spin-off 
efficiency level are the ones that profit the most from such a divestiture. Thus, the 
data do not confirm the efficiency increase hypotheses. Leverage shows a significant 
and negative coefficient; we would have expected a positive coefficient. 
Size is significant, just as in the regressions for the stock and bond returns. The 
dummy for senior bonds is nonsignificant, and the dummy for subordinated bonds is 
significant and negative. Finally, the focus-increasing dummy is not significant.  
 
IV. Conclusions 
 
Earlier studies find mixed evidence on wealth loss for the bondholders when 
the level of the firm diversification decreases. The negative correlations between the 
stock and bond returns and the negative bond returns in the announcement month 
found in some studies suggest that such restructuring leads to a wealth transfer from 
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bondholders to stockholders. But other research shows that the credit quality and the 
prices of corporate bonds do not suffer after a spin-off.  
In our study we use daily stock and bond data, combined with pre-spin-off firm 
characteristics, to examine the effects of corporate spin-off announcements on the 
value of both corporate debt and equity and the factors influencing wealth creation 
and redistribution in these spin-offs.  
We find positive announcement-period abnormal returns for stockholders, and 
either positive or nonsignificant abnormal returns for bondholders. When we split our 
sample into two periods, 1995-1997 and 1998-2002, we find nonsignificant  negative 
abnormal returns for the first subsample and significantly positive abnormal returns 
for the second subsample. This difference suggests that bondholders learn from past 
experiences and become better at protecting themselves against expropriation by 
stockholders.   
There are several factors associated with the sign and magnitude of 
announcement returns. Our simultaneous equation estimations show that both stock 
and bond abnormal returns are higher for firms with lower interest and dividend 
payouts. Stock abnormal returns are also higher for firms with higher pre-spin-off 
leverage. After correcting for these factors, we find that higher abnormal stock 
returns still lead to lower abnormal bond returns. This finding indicates that there is 
some wealth transfer due to the idiosyncratic conditions of the spin-off transactions.  
 37
Our overall conclusion from this study is that spin-offs result in the creation of 
overall value for both stock- and bondholders. 
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Table I. Sample selection. 
 
The announcements of spin-offs by U.S. firms made from January 1995 to January 2002. Our sources for the original 
announcement information are the SDC database and Lexis-Nexis.  
 
 Number of observations 
Number of announcements  612 
  
Excluded:  
Double announcements 41 
No bond data available 396 
Other type of divestitures wrongly classified as spin-offs 39 
Contaminating information 15 
Event could not be confirmed 13 
Other corporate actions regarding a division 6 
Not the first announcement 5 
Other reason 6 
Total excluded 521 
  
Final number of observations 91 
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Table II. Statistics. 
 
This table presents statistics for the firms that announce the spin-off of a company division to stockholders. We measure 
the variables as follows: the leverage as the debt ratio (ratio of total debt to invested capital); the interest and dividend 
payout as the ratio of the sum of total interest and dividend payments to operating cash flow; the efficiency of firm’s 
operations by the assets turnover ratio at the end of the year preceding the spin-off announcement; the investment 
expenditures by the ratio of the cash outflows for investment activities to earnings before interest and taxes;  relative 
size as the pre-spin-off ratio of subsidiary assets to the total assets of the parent company; and asset volatility as the 
weighted average of the annualized stock and bond return volatility prior to the spin-off announcement. The increase in 
industrial focus is our proxy for the decrease in the diversification level. We measure this variable as a dummy equal to 
one if the parent and subsidiary are in the different industries (measured by the two-digit SIC code), and to zero if the 
parent and subsidiary to be spun off are in the same industry. We obtain book values from the financial results of the 
year directly preceding the spin-off announcement. Assets and sales are in millions of U.S. dollars. 
 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Median Number of 
observations 
Panel A: Characteristics of parent firm before the spin-off 
Total Assets 21064.11 48823.24 5286.10 91 
Total Sales 14407.33 30600.34 5292.00 91 
Return on Stockholders' Equity 13.38 17.92 13.25 90 
Leverage 46.76 53.43 40.20 90 
Payout 59.74 167.02 40.47 90 
Efficiency 0.8938 0.5593 0.8611 91 
Investment expenditures 1.6149 2.9622 0.8937 91 
Stock Return Volatility 33.55 17.42 30.61 91 
Straight Bond Return Volatility 5.36 4.02 4.50 79 
Asset volatility 23.59 14.55 20.18 73 
Number of bonds per sample firm:     
   Straight bonds 3.99 4.24 2.00 91 
   Convertible bonds 0.27 0.64 0.00 91 
Time to Maturity (Straight Bonds) 10.32 7.17 8.21 79 
Panel B: Characteristics of spin-offs 
Fraction of completed spin-offs 84.62%   91 
Fraction of spin-offs that increased 
industrial focus 54.95%   91 
Relative size of spin-off 21.08% 14.18% 18.45% 91 
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Table III. Announcement-period returns 
 
This table presents abnormal returns to the stocks, bonds, and total firm value of the firms that announce the spin-off of 
a company division to stockholders. Panel A presents abnormal stock returns. We calculate these abnormal returns 
using the market model estimated over the 200-day period from 220 to 21 days preceding the spin-off announcement 
date. (In one case, due to the limited availability of data, this period is equal to 117 days.)  We use the S&P 500 index 
as our benchmark. Panel B presents abnormal bond returns. We calculate these abnormal returns using the mean- and 
market-adjusted model estimated over the 45-day period from 65 to 21 days preceding the spin-off announcement date. 
We use Merrill Lynch corporate bond indexes as our benchmark. Panel C presents abnormal bond returns for the firm 
sample. In this panel, each announcement is represented by median abnormal bond returns on all available bonds for a 
given company. Panel D presents abnormal changes in the total value of the firms that announce the spin-off of a 
company division to stockholders, and the correlation between abnormal changes in the values of debt and equity. The 
bonds in Panel D include both straight and convertible bonds. Each announcement is represented by median bond 
returns.  We calculate the firm returns as a weighted average of the stock and bond returns, using the pre-spin-off values 
of equity and debt to assets as weights. We calculate the abnormal changes in the values of debt and equity using 
abnormal stock and bond returns and pre-spin-off leverage and asset values. We test the significance of the mean 
abnormal returns using z-statistics (in parentheses), and the significance of the median abnormal returns using 
Wilcoxon test (test statistics in parentheses). We test the significance of the percentage of positive abnormal returns 
using sign test (test statistics in parentheses). *** is significant at the 0.01 level. ** is significant at the 0.05 level. * is 
significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
Panel A: Announcement-period returns to the stockholders 
 
Announcement 
window 
Number of 
observations 
Mean abnormal 
stock return 
Median abnormal 
stock return 
Percent of 
positive abnormal 
returns 
Day 0 91 2.017
*** 
(12.308) 
1.347*** 
(3.889) 
71.43*** 
(3.983) 
Day –1 to day +1 91 3.070
*** 
(9.440) 
2.615*** 
(4.118) 
71.43*** 
(3.983) 
 
Panel B: Announcement-period returns to bond holders: all-bond sample 
 
Announcement 
window 
Number of 
observations 
Mean abnormal 
bond return 
Median abnormal 
bond return 
Percent of 
positive abnormal 
returns 
Straight bonds     
Day 0 355 0.136*** 
(7.915) 
0.032*** 
(2.817) 
57.18*** 
(2.654) 
Day –1 to day +1 347 0.110*** 
(3.504) 
0.007 
(0.372) 
51.59 
(0.537) 
Convertible bonds    
Day 0 23 -0.551 
(-1.042) 
0.047 
(0.624) 
52.17 
(0.000) 
Day –1 to day +1 24 0.090 
(1.172) 
0.427 
(1.300) 
70.83* 
(1.837) 
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Panel C: Announcement-period returns to bond holders: firm sample 
 
Announcement 
window 
Number of 
observations 
Mean abnormal 
bond return 
Median abnormal 
bond return 
Percent of 
positive abnormal 
returns 
Straight bonds     
Day 0 78 0.059*** 
(3.306) 
0.037 
(1.136) 
56.41 
(1.019) 
Day –1 to day +1 77 0.008 
(1.002) 
-0.020 
(0.660) 
45.45 
(0.684) 
Convertible bonds    
Day 0 18 -0.703* 
(-1.743) 
-0.289 
(1.089) 
44.44 
(0.236) 
Day –1 to day +1 18 0.032 
(0.744) 
0.241 
(0.827) 
66.67 
(1.179) 
 
Panel D: Evidence on value creation and wealth transfer in spin-offs 
 
 
Changes in total firm value 
 Announcement 
window 
Number of 
observations Mean abnormal 
return 
Median 
abnormal 
return 
Percent of 
positive 
abnormal 
returns 
 
Correlation 
between 
abnormal 
changes in the 
values of debt 
and equity 
Day 0 87 1.479*** 
(9.836) 
0.846*** 
(3.714) 
67.82*** 
(3.216) 
0.158 
(1.475) 
Day –1 to day 
+1 
85 2.251*** 
(6.958) 
1.958*** 
(4.062) 
70.59*** 
(3.688) 
-0.308*** 
(-2.949) 
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Table IV.  
Comparison of the results of the current study with results in previous studies. 
 
This table presents a comparison of the results of the current study with results of the studies by Hite and Owers (1983), 
Dittmar (2004), and Maxwell and Rao (2003). Panel A includes a comparison of the abnormal returns between different 
event windows. Panel B presents a comparison of abnormal returns between different sample periods. The number of 
observations appears in parentheses. *** is significant at the 0.01 level. ** is significant at the 0.05 level. * is significant at 
the 0.10 level. n.s. is not significant. 
 
Panel A: Comparison of abnormal returns between different event windows 
 Straight bonds Stocks 
Hite and Owers (1983)   
Day -1, 0: 1963-1981   
Mean 0.2n.s. 3.3*** 
 (15) (123) 
Median NA NA 
Dittmar (2004)   
Monthly returns: 1983-1995   
Mean -0.6n.s. NA 
 (16)  
Median -0.2n.s. NA 
 (16)  
Maxwell and Rao (2003)   
Day 0, +1: 1976-1997   
Mean NA 3.585*** 
  (79) 
Median NA 2.568*** 
  (79) 
Monthly returns: 1976-1997   
Mean -0.878*** 2.892*** 
 (80) (79) 
Median -0.266*** 2.509*** 
 (80) (79) 
Our study   
Day -1, +1: 1995-2002   
Mean 0.008n.s. 3.070*** 
 (77) (91) 
Median -0.020n.s. 2.615*** 
 (77) (91) 
Day 0, +1: 1995-2002   
Mean 0.011n.s. 2.444*** 
 (78) (91) 
Median -0.004n.s. 1.529*** 
 (78) (91) 
Monthly returns: 1995-2002   
Mean 0.177*** 2.083*** 
 (78) (91) 
Median 0.018n.s. 2.502** 
 (78) (91) 
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Panel B: Comparison of abnormal returns between different sample periods 
 Straight bonds Stocks 
Our study   
Day -1, +1: 1995-1997   
Mean -0.136n.s. 3.629*** 
 (36) (43) 
Median -0.058* 2.893*** 
 (36) (43) 
Day -1, +1: 1998-2002   
Mean 0.135** 2.570*** 
 (41) (48) 
Median 0.041n.s. 1.633** 
 (41) (48) 
   
Day -1, +1: difference between 1995-1997 
and 1998-2002 
  
Mean 0.271** -1.059n.s. 
Median 0.099* -1.260n.s. 
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Table V. 
Regressions of announcement-period returns: Joint regressions of stock and bond returns. 
 
This table presents the results of the three-stage least squares regressions  of the three-day abnormal returns to the 
common stock and straight and convertible bonds of the firms that announce the spin-off of a company division to 
stockholders AR(-1,1). We calculate the abnormal stock returns using the market model estimated over the 200-day 
period from 220 to 21 days preceding the spin-off announcement date. (In one case, due to the limited availability of 
data, this period is equal to 117 days.) We use the S&P 500 index as our benchmark. We calculate the abnormal bond 
returns using the mean- and market-adjusted model estimated over the 45-day period from 65 to 21 days preceding the 
spin-off announcement date. Each announcement is represented by median bond returns. We use Merrill Lynch 
corporate bond indexes as our benchmark. We use the debt ratio (ratio of total debt to invested capital) as our proxy for 
the leverage. We measure the interest and dividend payout as the ratio of the sum of total interest and dividend 
payments to operating cash flow. We measure the efficiency of firm’s operations by the assets turnover ratio at the end 
of the year preceding the spin-off announcement, and the investment expenditures by the ratio of the cash outflows for 
investment activities to earnings before interest and taxes. Information asymmetry is measured by the asset volatility 
prior to the spin-off announcement. We measure asset volatility as the weighted average of the annualized stock and 
bond return volatility. Increase in industrial focus is a dummy equal to one if the parent and subsidiary are in the 
different industries (measured by the two-digit SIC code), and to zero if the parent and spin-off subsidiary are in the 
same industry. We measure relative size as the pre-spin-off ratio of subsidiary assets to the total assets of the parent 
company. Leverage, payout, efficiency, investment expenditures and relative size are measured using the financial 
results of the year directly preceding the spin-off announcement. t-statistics appear in parentheses.  *** is significant at 
the 0.01 level.  ** is significant at the 0.05 level. * is significant at the 0.10 level. 
 Stock AR   Bond AR   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Firm value 
change 
hypothesis 
Wealth 
transfer 
hypothesis 
Estimation 
results 
Firm value 
change 
hypothesis 
Wealth 
transfer 
hypothesis 
Estimation 
results 
Intercept   -0.932 (-0.499) 
 
 -0.044 (-0.194) 
Leverage 
+ 0 
2.566** 
(2.447) + 0 
0.108 
(0.811) 
Payout 
- 0 
-1.072*** 
(-3.285) - 0 
-0.096* 
(-1.829) 
Efficiency 
- 0 
2.118** 
(2.092) - 0 
-0.211 
(-1.492) 
Investment Expenditures 
- 0 
0.064 
(0.309) - 0 
0.036 
(1.306) 
Information Asymmetry 
+ 0 
0.015 
(0.375) + 0 
0.002 
(0.373) 
Increase in Industrial Focus 
+ + 
1.482 
(1.375) + - 
0.114 
(0.778) 
Abnormal stock return    
0 - 
-0.038* 
(-1.769) 
Relative size   0.108*** 
(2.726) 
  0.023*** 
(4.577) 
Relative size*Dummy for 
negative abnormal return 
  -0.322*** 
(-6.835) 
  -0.028*** 
(-5.422) 
Subordinated bonds      0.073 
(0.315) 
Senior bonds      0.290 
(1.470) 
Adjusted R sq.   0.52   0.30 
Number of Obs.   86   83 
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Table VI.  
Regressions of announcement-period total firm returns. 
 
This table presents results of the OLS regressions of the three-day abnormal returns to the total value of the firms that 
announce the spin-off of a company division to stockholders AR(-1,1). We calculate the abnormal stock returns using 
the market model estimated over the 200-day period from 220 to 21 days preceding the spin-off announcement date. In 
one case, due to the limited availability of data, this period is equal to 117 days. We use the S&P 500 index as a 
benchmark. We calculate the abnormal bond returns using the mean- and market-adjusted model estimated over the 45-
day period from 65 to 21 days preceding the spin-off announcement date. Each announcement is represented by median 
bond returns. We use Merrill Lynch corporate bond indexes as our benchmark. We calculate the firm returns as the 
weighted average of the stock and bond returns, using the pre-spin-off values of equity and debt to assets as weights. 
We use the debt ratio (ratio of total debt to invested capital) as our proxy for the leverage. We measure the interest and 
dividend payout as the ratio of the sum of total interest and dividend payments to operating cash flow. We measure the 
efficiency of firm’s operations by the assets turnover ratio at the end of the year preceding the spin-off announcement, 
and the investment expenditures by the ratio of the cash outflows for investment activities to earnings before interest 
and taxes. We measure information asymmetry by the asset volatility prior to the spin-off announcement, and asset 
volatility as the weighted average of the annualized stock and bond return volatility. We measure the increase in 
industrial focus as a dummy equal to one if the parent and subsidiary are in the different industries (measured by the 
two-digit SIC code), and as zero if the parent and spin-off subsidiary are in the same industry. We measure relative size 
as the pre-spin-off ratio of subsidiary assets to the total assets of the parent company. We measure leverage, payout, 
efficiency, investment expenditures, and relative size using the financial results of the year directly preceding the spin-
off announcement. t-statistics, based on White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, appear in 
parentheses. *** is significant at the 0.01 level.  ** is significant at the 0.05 level. * is significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
 Firm value change 
hypothesis 
Estimation results 
 
Intercept  
2.493** 
(2.137) 
Leverage 
+ 
-4.314*** 
(-6.268) 
Payout 
- 
-0.802*** 
(-3.321) 
Efficiency 
- 
1.348* 
(1.966) 
Investment Expenditures 
- 
0.285 
(1.653) 
Information Asymmetry 
+ 
-0.009 
(-0.258) 
Increase in Industrial Focus 
+ 
0.707 
(0.891) 
Relative size  0.088** 
(2.474) 
Relative size*Dummy for 
negative abnormal return 
 -0.220*** 
(-5.698) 
Subordinated bonds  -1.822* 
(-1.803) 
Senior bonds  -0.761 
(-0.565) 
Adjusted R sq.  0.57 
Number of Obs.  83 
 
